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A short reaction to the US Report on Human Rights Practices - 2007- in Algeria.
Concerning the situation in Kabylia and the relationship between this besieged Amazigh region and the Arabic-Islamist and antidemocratic Algerian government, the American officials seem to have not dug enough to understand what lies behind the screen of the Algerian official lies. Saying that “The ethnic Berber minority of about nine million centered in the Kabylie region participated freely and actively in the political process and represented one-third of the government ministers.”, is to ignore a very important reality where Kabylian political leaders have to give up all their human, cultural, democratic and secular values to get a flap seat in the Algerian dictatorial government.
To understand what happens to Kabylians under this dictatorial government system, let’s take (as an imaginary example) the case of this American citizen who gets his Algerian citizenship and who then seeks to take part in the political life of his new country. The situation would be as follows : If the new American-Algerian citizen doesn’t accept to become an hypocrite by giving up his culture, his religion, his personnel beliefs and refuses to embrace the totalitarian and antihuman Arabic-Islamic ideology he would get no chance to have access to the government and no chance to live freely in his new country. He will be exactly like all the Kabylians who live in a huge country where personal and cultural freedom is forbidden in reality.
True authentic Kabylians feel to live under an Arabic-Islamic colonisation, in an open prison called Algeria. The American officials should understand that the authoritarian Arabic-Islamist government goal, since our confiscated independence in 1962, is to commit a cultural anti-Berber genocide against Kabylia in particular and against Algeria in general. This is done by using different means like terror, killings, economic sabotage, and all kinds of humiliations and pressures.
The Algerian government is acting like all his fascist government allies in North Africa and the Middle-East by sacrificing the people’s human rights and true identity to perpetuate the Arabic-Islamic colonization (or dominance) which started in the 7th century. Consequently, Algeria which is a Berber country is renamed Arabic, and the Berber Algerian people who have always been subjected to a violent Arabic-Islamic assimilation (through schools and mosques) are renamed Arabs. True Kabylians (Berbers = Amazighs) want the end of the Arabic-Islamic colonisation. They want the Algerian government to acknowledge the Berber identity of Algeria by stopping to confine all the Berber populations in its fascist Arabic-Islamic ideology.
Kabylians want their true identity and their true culture to be promoted by their own government in their own country. Kabylians seek to live in a tolerant cultural and political environment where their existence is acknowledged and respected. Thank you. - Tifirelest.
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2007
Algeria
The ethnic Berber minority of about nine million centered in the Kabylie region participated freely and actively in the political process and represented one-third of the government ministers.
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 11, 2008
Algeria is a multiparty republic of approximately 33 million inhabitants whose head of state (president) is elected by popular vote to a five-year term. The president has the constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss cabinet members and the prime minister, who serves as the head of government. The president also serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. President Bouteflika was re-elected in 2004 in a generally transparent, contested election. Multiparty parliamentary elections on May 17 were conducted in a generally transparent manner, but not all political parties were allowed full access to the electoral process. Multiparty local elections were held on November 29, but the election process was marred by irregularitiesand charges of fraud.In 1992 authorities imposed a state of emergency which continued during the year. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority.
The government continued to fail to account for thousands of persons who disappeared in detention during the 1990s. Other significant human rights problems included restrictions on political party activity limiting the right to change the government peacefully ; reports of abuse and torture ; official impunity ; prolonged pretrial detention ; limited judicial independence ; denial of fair, public trials ; restrictions on civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, assembly, and especially association ; security-based restrictions on movement ; limitations on religious freedom, including increased regulation of non-Muslim worship ; corruption and lack of government transparency ; discrimination against women ; and restrictions on workers’ rights.
Armed groups committed a significant number of abuses against civilians, government officials, and members of security forces.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From :
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.
In contrast to previous years, Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and government press releases concerning the total number of terrorist, civilian, and security force deaths were infrequent. However, during the year, according to MOI and press reports, the total number of terrorist, civilian, and security force deaths increased to 670 (compared to 489 in 2006 and 488 in 2005). Of these, government and press reports stated that terrorists killed 132 civilians (70 in 2006, 76 in 2005) and 160 security force members (142 in 2006, 177 in 2005) ; security forces killed an estimated 378 suspected terrorists (277 in 2006, 235 in 2005).
Most of the terrorist attacks during the year were attributed to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which allied itself to Al-Qa’ida in September 2006 and changed its name in January to Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
The year was marked by significant violence. For example, on April 11, three suicide car bomb attacks in Algiers caused 33 deaths and over 100 injuries. One of the attacks targeted the building housing the prime minister’s office and the office of the interior ministry. The two other attacks targeted a police station in Bab Ezzouar, a suburb of Algiers. AQIM claimed responsibility for the attacks.
On July 11, a suicide car bomb attack occurred in Lakhdaria, a town southeast of Algiers, targeting a military barracks and resulting in 10 deaths and 35 injuries, all soldiers. On September 6, a man wearing a suicide vest detonated himself in a crowd in Batna waiting to greet President Bouteflika, killing 19 citizens, injuring 107. On September 8, a suicide car bomb detonated inside a coastguard base in Dellys, killing 35 and wounding 60. On December 11, two suicide vehicle bombs in Algiers claimed the lives of 37 individuals, according to press reports. A bus filled with students bore the brunt of one of the blasts. The other bombing specifically targeted the offices of the UN Development Program (UNDP) and resulted in the deaths of 11 UN workers. AQIM claimed responsibility for all five attacks.
In February 2006 Ali Tounsi, director general of the national police, stated that terrorism had been nearly eliminated and that organized crime was responsible for some of the violence. Subsequent events, however, did not support this claim. During the year most violence continued to be localized in mountainous and rural areas in northern Algeria. Revenge, banditry, and land ownership disputes prompted some of the reported killings.
In July Minister of Interior and Local Authorities Nourredine Yazid Zerhouni stated that 4,800 policemen were killed by terrorism during the "national tragedy" of the 1990s.
b. Disappearance
Enforced "disappearances", reportedly numbering in the thousands, were a significant problem during the 1990’s.
In July Daho Ould Kablia, a minister-delegate in the Ministry of Interior in charge of Local Collectivities claimed in an interview with the newspaper Echourouk el-Youmi, "There has been no forced disappearance since 1999." On February 6, Algeria signed the new International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. Law 06-01 of February 27 provides measures for compensating victims of "disappearances."
In March 2006 the UN Human Rights Committee issued its first ruling on enforced disappearances in the country. The Committee found that the government violated several provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights when it failed to protect the rights and life of Salah Saker and Riad Boucherf, who disappeared in 1994 and 1995 respectively.
For courts to hear charges of disappearance, the law requires at least two eyewitnesses. Thousands of disappearances occurred in the 1990s, many later attributed to the security forces. The government did not prosecute any security force personnel, and there was no evidence that the government investigated any of the cases that it acknowledged were caused by security forces.
The total number of disappeared during the 1990s continued to be debated. In 2006 the government estimated that 6,546 persons were missing or disappeared as a result of government actions between 1992 and 1999, with approximately 10,000 additional persons missing or disappeared from terrorist kidnappings and murders. Local NGOs reported that security forces played a role in the disappearances of approximately 8,000 persons.
In 2005 voters approved by referendum President Bouteflika’s proposed Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which ended the Ad Hoc Mechanism established in 2003 to account for the disappeared. The charter went into effect in March 2006, granting amnesty to and preventing investigation into the conduct of the National Popular Army, the security forces, state-sponsored armed groups, and persons who fought on behalf of the government. The full text of the law was not provided to citizens prior to the vote and human rights organizations voiced concern in 2006 that the law consecrated impunity for crimes committed by security forces.
The amnesty also covered certain persons involved in Islamist militant and terrorist activities. To qualify for amnesty, individuals engaged in terrorism had to cease armed activities and surrender themselves and their weapons to the authorities. Persons implicated in mass killings, rapes, or bomb attacks in public places were not eligible for amnesty. Many imprisoned terrorists were also given amnesty. Some local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including Somoud, Djazairouna, and the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights, criticized the charter for enabling terrorists to escape justice for crimes they committed against civilians.
Families of the disappeared experienced complications and delays in receiving compensation from the government. According to the Ministry of National Solidarity (MNS), a special fund valued at approximately $231 million (approximately 15.6 billion dinars) was used to compensate individuals eligible under the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. At least 17,000 requests for compensation have been submitted, of which approximately 5,300 requests will be honored. Another 2,700 requests are under consideration. The remaining 9,000 requests will not benefit directly from the charter, but the individuals will receive financial assistance from MNS. Compensation is handled at the wilaya (province) level and amounts of payments vary.
During the year press reports indicated that 35 civilians were kidnapped in the Kabylie region by AQIM. Press reports indicated that AQIM (then known as GSPC) kidnapped approximately 55 civilians in 2006.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Articles 34 and 35 of the constitution and articles 263 and 263 bis-1 of the penal code prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment ; however, NGO and local human rights activists reported that government officials employed such practices and that the members of the military intelligence service’s Department of Information and Security (DRS) frequently used torture to obtain confessions.
The penal code criminalizes torture ; government agents can face prison sentences of up to 10 to 20 years for committing such acts, based on a December 2006 modification to the law. However, impunity remained a problem.
Human rights lawyers maintained that torture continued to occur in DRS detention facilities, most often against those arrested on "security grounds." The Amnesty International Report 2007 reported detainees were "beaten, tortured with electric shocks, suspended from the ceiling, and forced to swallow large amounts of dirty water, urine, or chemicals... Reports of torture and ill treatment were not known to have been investigated." In July 2006 Amnesty International (AI) published a report on torture by the secret military police, which concluded that the security forces continued to benefit from impunity.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
During the year the government permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UNDP, and the Red Crescent Society to visit regular, nonmilitary prisons. ICRC visits were in accord with standard modalities. The government denied independent human rights observers visits to military and high-security prisons and detention centers. In August a British delegation along with experts from the European Commission visited prisons run by the justice ministry’s penitentiary administration. According to press reports, one British expert who had visited two prisons said that prisons did not meet international standards for medical care and recreational activities.
In a November press conference, Mokhtar Felioune, the justice ministry’s Director General of the Prisons Administration said there were 54,000 prisoners housed in 127 prisons. He added that 6,100 of the 54,000 had not yet been convicted. Overcrowding was a problem in some prisons. According to human rights lawyers, the problem of overpopulation can be partially explained by "the abusive recourse to pretrial detention." Detainees are held separately in the prison system.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention. In 2005 the head of the government-appointed National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (CNCPPDH) said that pretrial detention, although defined as an exceptional measure by article 123 of the penal code, was overused (See section 4 regarding role of CNCPPDH).
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus
The national police force (DGSN), consisting of more than 108,000 members, falls under the control of the MOI and has national jurisdiction. The gendarmerie, under the Ministry of Defense, also performs police-like functions outside urban areas. The military intelligence service’s DRS reports to the defense ministry and exercises internal security functions. Police and gendarmerie were generally effective at maintaining order. All security forces are provided a copy of a code of conduct establishing regulations for conduct and sanctions for abuses. Corruption existed, especially in the customs police.
Impunity remained a significant problem. The government did not provide disaggregated public information on the numbers, infractions, or punishments of police, military, or other security force personnel.
In 2006, according to human rights attorneys, police officials, and local NGOs, the most frequent abuse of police authority occurred as a result of officers not following established guidelines for arrests.
During the year, Ali Tounsi, director general of the DGSN, confirmed that 10 DGSN officials arrested for embezzlement, use of public money for personal gain, and cronyism were "no longer a part of the police force." Trials were conducted by the DGSN and the officials were fired. DGSN membership was more than 108,000.
In August General Commander of the National Gendarmerie Ahmed Bousteila announced that between 2000 and 2006 the gendarmerie had fired 5,000 gendarmes for violating a professional code of ethics and for being involved in corruption, absenteeism, tardiness, and drinking on duty. The National Gendarmerie further stated that, of the 5,000 fired, 1,600 gendarmes had been brought to justice for various charges. No information was available at year’s end on whether cases were pending against the other 3,400 gendarmes fired.
Arrest and Detention
According to the law, police must obtain a summons from the prosecutor’s office to require a suspect to appear in a police station for preliminary questioning. Summonses are also used to notify and require the accused and/or the victim(s) to attend a court proceeding or hearing.
The government issues warrants under three different circumstances : to bring an individual from work or home to a court ; to execute a prosecutor’s approved request to place a person into custody pending trial ; or to arrest a suspect considered to be a flight risk. Police may make arrests without a warrant if they witness an offense taking place. Lawyers reported that procedures for warrants and summonses were usually carried out properly.
The constitution specifies that a suspect may be held in detention for up to 48 hours without charge. If more time is required for gathering additional evidence, the police may request that the prosecutor extend the suspect’s detention to 72 hours. Those suspected of terrorism or subversion may legally be held for 12 days without charge or access to counsel. In practice, the security forces generally adhered to the 48-hour limit in nonterrorism cases. However, detainees in prolonged pretrial detention were sometimes not promptly charged.
Prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem. The law does not provide a person in detention with the right to a prompt judicial determination of the legality of the detention. Persons charged with acts against the security of the state, including terrorism, may be held in pretrial detention as long as 20 months, according to the penal code ; the prosecutor must show cause every four months for continuing pretrial detention.
Judges rarely refused prosecutor requests for extending preventive detention. Detention can be appealed to a higher court but was rarely overturned. If the detention is overturned, the defendant can request compensation. In December 2005, the minister of justice acknowledged publicly that prosecutors sometimes abused investigative detention. Most detainees had prompt access to a lawyer of their choice and, if indigent, were provided a lawyer by the government. In November according to the prison administration, pretrial detainees represented 6,100 persons or 11 percent, of those held by prison authorities.
There is no system of bail, but in nonfelony cases suspects are usually released on "provisional liberty" while waiting for trial. Under provisional liberty, suspects are required to report weekly to the police station in their district and are forbidden from leaving the country.
The penal code requires detainees in pretrial detention to be immediately informed of their right to communicate with family members, receive visitors, and be examined by a doctor of their choice at the end of detention. In addition, any suspect can request a medical examination once on police premises or before facing the judge. In practice, however, detainees were typically examined only at the end of their detention. Frequent reports that these rights were not extended to detainees continued during the year.
Local and international NGOs and activists, however, reported that there was no official news of the whereabouts of Fethi Hamaddouche. He has not been heard from since he was last seen on March 5 in the custody of the DRS. In March AI reported that Youcef Belmouaz and Brahim Abed disappeared in November 2006 and were held incommunicado by the DRS. According to a local NGO, the two were released after seven months. On June 6, local NGOs said that Mohamed Fatmia disappeared from his job at a construction site in an Algiers suburb. On July 18, according to human rights activists, Mohamed Rahmouni disappeared after being taken into custody. According to the local NGO SOS Disparus, the whereabouts of Hamaddouche, Fatmia, and Rahmouni also remained unknown at the end of the year.
In June 2006, according to local and international NGOs, Mohammed Rabah Ajine, Zeineddine Belacel, and Habib Boukhatemi, all from Tiaret, disappeared and were later placed in pretrial detention in Algiers. In October 2006 the three appeared before a judge and were charged with belonging to a terrorist group operating in the country and abroad. They reportedly were being held in Berrouaguia at the end of the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Although the constitution provides for an independent judiciary, executive branch decrees and influence limited judicial independence. The constitution provides for the right to a fair trial ; however, in practice, authorities sometimes did not respect legal provisions regarding defendants’ rights and denied due process.
The High Judicial Council is responsible for judicial discipline and the appointment of all judges. President Bouteflika was President of the Council.
The judiciary is composed of civil courts, which heard cases involving civilians facing charges not related to security or terrorism, and the military courts, which can hear cases involving civilians facing security and terrorism charges. Regular criminal courts can try cases involving security-related offenses at the local level. Legal decisions regarding family matters are based on both Shari’a (Islamic law) as well as civil law.
Military courts in Oran, Blida, Constantine, and Bechar try cases involving state security, espionage, and other security-related offenses involving military personnel and civilians. Each tribunal consists of three civilian judges and two military judges. Although the president of each court is a civilian, the chief judge is a military officer. Defense lawyers must be accredited by the military tribunal in order to appear. Public attendance at the trial is at the discretion of the tribunal. Appeals are made directly to the Supreme Court. Military tribunals try cases, but only occasionally disclose information on proceedings. There was no public information available on any cases before them during the year.
The nine-member Constitutional Council reviewed the constitutionality of treaties, laws, and regulations. Although the council is not part of the judiciary, it has the authority to nullify laws found unconstitutional, to confirm the results of any type of election, and to serve as the final arbiter of amendments that pass both chambers of the parliament before becoming law.
As part of a program intended to eliminate judicial corruption, in February the High Judicial Council decided the cases of 17 suspended magistrates. Six magistrates were permanently fired from the Court of Algiers, two received a "serious warning," three were demoted, and three were found innocent. The decisions regarding the remaining three magistrates were not available at year’s end.
In 2005 at a disciplinary hearing that did not afford full due process, the High Judicial Council permanently dismissed and disbarred Judge Mohamed Ras El Ain, who was accused of criticizing the politicization of the judiciary. Ras El Ain maintained that the judicial system had been abused to serve the interests of a political party
Most trials are public and nonjury. Defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to be present and to consult with an attorney, provided at public expense if necessary. Defendants can confront or question witnesses against them or present witnesses and evidence on their behalf. Defendants and their attorneys were sometimes denied access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases. Defendants also have the right to appeal. The testimonies of men and women are considered of equal weight.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
Unlike in the previous year, there were no reports of political prisoners and political detainees during the year.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
The judiciary was not fully independent and impartial in civil matters, and particularly lacks independence in human rights cases. Family connections and status of the parties involved reportedly influenced decisions. Individuals may bring lawsuits and there are administrative processes related to the amnesty, which may provide damages for human rights violations and compensation for alleged wrongs.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The constitution prohibits such actions ; in practice, however, government authorities infringed on citizens’ privacy rights. The government actively monitored the communications of political opponents, journalists, human rights groups, and suspected terrorists. The DRS and other security officials reportedly searched homes without a search warrant.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including :
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press ; however, the government restricted these rights in practice through harassment and arrest for defamation and informal pressure on publishers, editors, and journalists.
Individuals generally were able to criticize the government privately without reprisal. However, citizens generally self-censored public criticism. The government attempted to impede criticism by monitoring political meetings.
The law specifies that freedom of speech must respect "individual dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and the national defense." The state of emergency decree introduced in 1992 and still in effect, gives the government broad authority to restrict these freedoms and take legal action against what it considers to be threats to the state or public order. These regulations were heavily applied throughout the year.
Radio and television are government-owned, with coverage favorable to government policy. During nonelection periods, opposition spokesmen were generally denied access to public radio or television. Some opposition parties had severely limited access to television. These limitations, however, were less evident for radio. Political parties and independent candidates received the same amount of radio access time during the three-week campaign period prior to the May legislative elections and again prior to the November local elections. Several opposition parties said that their daily media allotment during the three-week period was the first time they had been allowed media access since the last election cycle.
The country’s print media consisted of more than 52 daily, 95 weekly, 14 fortnightly, 27 monthly, and 3 occasional publications that supported or opposed the government to varying degrees. According to Ministry of Communication statistics, 29 newspapers circulated in excess of 10,000 copies each. The government owned two French-language and three Arabic-language newspapers. Many political parties, including legal Islamic parties, had access to the independent press and made use of it to express their views. Opposition parties also disseminated information via the Internet and in communiqués.
The law permits the government to levy fines and to imprison members of the press in a manner that restricts press freedom. The government censored directly and indirectly and intimidated the media into practicing self-censorship. The government used defamation laws to harass and arrest journalists, and the press faced government retaliation for criticizing government officials.
A presidential decree of February 2006 criminalizes free speech about the conduct of the security forces during the internal conflict.
Charges of defamation are based on the 1990 communication law which protects Islam from defamation, controls access to external information, and outlaws writing that threatens national unity. In 2001, the laws were amended to criminalize writing, cartoons, and speech that insult or offend the president, parliament, judiciary, or armed forces. The penal code imposes high fines and prison terms of up to 24 months for defamation or "the insult" of government figures, including the president, members of parliament, judges, members of the military, and "any other authority of public order." Those convicted face prison sentences that range from 3 to 24 months and fines of $740 to $7,400(50,000 to 500,000 dinars).
Defamation laws were used by the government in an attempt to silence editors, journalists, and the owners of printing houses. On October 18, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) condemned actions taken by the Algerian government against journalists. In the press release, IFJ General Secretary, Aidan White said, "Algeria has been using its criminal law to silence any critical voices and journalists continue to be victims of this repressive tactic. We are calling on the government to make a commitment to press freedom and to allow the media to work independently without fear of reprisals."
On April 4, the Algiers Court of Appeal imposed suspended sentences of six months in prison and a fine of $7,400 (500,000 dinars) on editor Ali Fodel and reporter Naila Berahal of the Arabic-language daily Echourok el-Youmi. The prosecutor’s request to have the newspaper closed was rejected. In October 2006 an Algiers court convicted both men on charges of defaming "Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, the Libyan state, and the security of the Algerian and Libyan states." The judge sentenced both defendants to six months in prison and ordered the newspaper closed for two months. Fodel and Berahai appealed.
In April 18, Saad Lounes was given a one-year sentence for tax fraud on the basis of a complaint by the Ministry of Commerce dating back to 1995. Lounes was the target of legal pressure for more than 10 years, resulting in the loss of his newspaper and his printing company Sodipress, the only privately owned printing house at that time. His company printed several publications that the state presses refused to handle. Lounes appealed the court’s decision. Lounes currently resides abroad.
On October 15, Dhif Talal, an Al Fadjr journalist, was sentenced to a jail term of six months after being convicted of defamation charges. The initial charges were brought by the Ministry of Agriculture because of Talal’s article exposing monetary losses suffered by the ministry due to poor administration. Talal appealed the decision but a court date had not been set by year’s end.